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Abstract 
 
The question of “the relationship between the individual and society” has troubled group 
analysis since its inception. This paper offers a reading of Foulkes that highlights the 
emergent, yet evanescent, psychosocial ontology in his writings, and argues for the 
development of a truly psychosocial group analysis, which moves beyond the 
individual/society dualism. It argues for a shift towards a language of relationality, and 
proposes new theoretical resources for such a move from relational sociology, relational 
psychoanalysis and the “matrixial thinking” of Bracha Ettinger which would broaden and 
deepen group analytic understandings of relationality. 
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Introduction 
 
A preoccupation with the troubling question of “the relationship between the individual 
and society” is one of the distinctive characteristics of group analysis as a 
psychotherapeutic modality. Both the body of writing that constitutes “group-analytic 
thinking”, and the training programmes that transmit and reproduce group analysis devote 
considerable attention to this knotty problem. Group analysis is not, however, alone in 
this; the historical and philosophical emergence and consequences of the individual/ 
society dualism  have been subject to extensive exposition and critique across the social 
sciences and humanities for many decades. The disquisitions of Foulkes on this subject 
are the starting point for group-analytic thinking, and indeed for this paper, and within 
these, I will argue, there are suggestions of a psychosocial ontology that was more 
innovative and ground-breaking than is often realized. However, these intimations of the 
psychosocial have an evanescent quality, tending to slip from Foulkes’ theoretical grasp. 
Moreover, they have been largely unrecognized by those who have followed on and 
developed his work, with the consequence that the individual/ society dualism repeatedly 
reasserts itself in group analytic thinking. In this context, I shall suggest that group 
analysis would now, in the early 21st century, be best served by relinquishing its 
attachment to this problematic. Instead of encouraging interminable engagement with the 
unsolvable dilemma of whether to “prioritize” the individual or society, I propose a shift 
in our conceptual horizons towards a language of relationality, the ground for which was 
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laid in Foulkes’ work, but which can be developed in dialogue with recent developments 
in psychoanalytic and sociological thinking. 
 
Exemplifying the self-understanding that characterizes group analysis as counter-
normative, group analysis repeatedly abstracts a single phrase from the work of Foulkes 
that might be seen as crystallizing the essence of his departure from dominant, western, 
post-Enlightenment ways of thinking: the individual is “an artificial, though plausible, 
abstraction”.  This phrase represents what Farhad Dalal (Dalal 1998) refers to as “the 
Radical Foulkes”, as opposed to “the Orthodox”, Freudian Foulkes, suggesting that, in 
speaking to “two masters” (1998: 77), Freud and Elias, Foulkes “has left a trail of 
inconsistencies and contradictions” (1998:11). Dalal, who clearly prefers the “Radical” to 
the “Orthodox”, the sociological to the psychoanalytic, argues that “as one reads through 
his four books, it is possible to see his [Foulkes’] view change from an individual 
psychoanalytic viewpoint to one that is increasingly radical, systemic, and group 
oriented” (1998:34). Dalal’s argument for a post-Foulkesian group analysis proposes to 
develop “the Radical Foulkes” so that group analysis begins with the group, not the 
individual (1998:157). Grounding his argument in the work of Elias, Dalal grants 
ontological priority to the group, as, he argues, does Foulkes, as he moves away from 
Freudian psychoanalysis. In what follows, I challenge both Dalal’s reading of Foulkes, 
and his ontological prescription for the future of group analysis.  
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Reading Foulkes – contextually, closely, critically 
 
My first task, in the spirit of contextualization that I see as essential to a group analytic 
way of thinking, is to seek to understand the Foulkes’ construction of the relationship 
between the individual and society in relation to the wider body of work from which it 
has been extracted, and within its context of production and address.  
 
Foulkes’ training first in medicine, then specializing in neurology and psychiatry, and 
thereafter as a psychoanalyst, constituted the conditions of possibility of his thinking and 
writing. i More than “background”, to the “foreground” of the emergence of group 
analysis, as he might have seen them, these disciplines, their conceptual tools and 
communities of practice, shaped the language with which he struggled to formulate this 
new field, framed his mode of argumentation, and, in the case of the psychoanalytic 
profession, were often his (real or imagined) interlocutors. His first major work, 
Introduction to Group Analytic Psychotherapy (1948), in which this famous phrase 
appears, both draws on the science of neurology and critiques scientific method, pays 
obeisance to psychoanalysis and poses a radical challenge to many of its fundamental 
assumptions. Contra Dalal, who sees his “Radical Foulkes” – the one who “proceeds 
from the group” (1998:157) - as emerging over time, my chronological reading of 
Foulkes suggests that what I believe is most radical and innovative about his work is 
evident in this first book, whilst the theoretical limitations that were to remain in his work 
were also present from the outset. 
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Introduction begins: “Life is a complex whole. It can only artificially be separated into 
parts, analysed” (1948:1). The assertion of ontological holism is presented as a critique of 
the “isolating scientific method” that gained dominance in the 19th century. Foulkes 
argues that abstractions are often necessary, but become problematic when applied “to 
every ‘disease’” (1948:3). Arguing that psychoanalysis has begun the work of 
acknowledging the importance of the “total situation” (1948:7), and investigating how 
“the present personality and the present situation, even in their totality, are inseparable 
from the past – that of the individual and the race – and the future” (1948: 9), he credits 
Freud’s topographical theory with showing that “the ‘outer’ world becomes internalised, 
that man’s inner dynamic world is a microcosmic reflection of the whole world, at least 
his whole world” (1948:10). However, he also critiques psychoanalysis for failing, thus 
far, to have “allotted to this social side of man the same basic importance as it has his 
instinctual aspect” (1948:10). He goes on to argue, in holistic terms, that it is wrong to 
understand “the ‘world’ and ‘society’ or even the family” in terms of “`individual’ 
interactions”: 
It is the same mistake, as it was, to consider the whole as the sum of its parts. 
From a mature, scientific point of view, the opposite is true: each individual – 
itself an artificial, though plausible, abstraction – is basically and centrally 
determined, inevitably, by the world in which he lives, by the community, the 
group, of which he forms a part. Progress in all the sciences during the last 
decades has led to the same independent and concerted conclusion; that the old 
juxtaposition of an inside and outside world, constitution and environment, 
individual and society, phantasy and reality, body and mind and so on, are 
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untenable. They can at no stage be separated from each other, except by artificial 
isolation (1948: 10).  
 
Clearly not the expression of orthodox Freudianism that would be expected from Dalal’s 
historiography of Foulkes, I see here the crystallisation of Foulkes’ struggle with the 
individual/ society dichotomy. In this short passage, Foulkes begins by grounding his 
claim (albeit without acknowledging this) in a classical Durkheimian sociological 
ontology which claims the sui generis nature of society, that is, its irreducibility to the 
level of individuals.ii In the context of Foulkes’ psychoanalytic audience, this was a 
radical move. He goes on to articulate a strong social determinism: the individual, 
artificially abstracted from the overarching reality of society, is “basically and centrally 
determined” by the group.  
 
There are a number of conceptual problems with this formulation, which, I suggest, offers 
an inadequate understanding of both sides of the dualism. One issue, largely unaddressed 
within the group analytic literature, but a major concern for sociology, is how, within 
such a paradigm, to account for change, at the level of the social or the individual: what 
are the sources of transformation, creativity, innovation? It is no accident that within 
sociology the individual/ society dualism is commonly discussed alongside the agency/ 
structure dualism. What might be a radical, critical move in relation to psychoanalysis is 
a deterministic, intellectually, politically and practically disempowering move within a 
wider frame of reference. In refusing the idea that “the ‘world’ and ‘society’ or even the 
family” might be understood in terms of the aggregation of individual actions, he 
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implicitly comes down on the structuralist side of the agency/ structure debate, and could 
be criticised for reifying the notions of “world”, “society” and “family”.iii From the other 
side of the dualism, this conceptualization of the individual closes down the possibility of 
accounting for the lived experience of singularity, the particularity of subjectivity at the 
level of the individual. This is a problem to which no form of psychotherapeutic practice 
can fail to attend. 
 
However, Foulkes in fact immediately undercuts this position, with a statement that 
might now be understood as psychosocial, rather than classically sociological, and that is, 
I would suggest, more productive for group analysis than the “group genesis” that Dalal 
favours. Some fifty years ahead of the explicit articulation of psychosocial studies, which 
emerged in the UK since the mid 1990s, Foulkes proposed a remarkably similar 
deconstruction of the binaries of internal/ external, individual/ society, nature/ culture, as 
this new field.iv In rejecting the demarcation between psychology and sociology, which 
allocates to psychology the scientific study of the mind, ‘the individual’, ‘inner life’, 
affect and emotion, and to sociology the study of ‘society’, ‘external worlds’, and macro-
structures and processes, psychosocial studies refuses the separation of the spheres of 
‘psychic’ and ‘social’, and rejects the idea that ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ worlds are empirically 
or theoretically separable.  
 
Addressing his audience of psychoanalysts and psychiatrists, and perceiving the need, 
therefore, to expand on the socio-genetic side of his argument, Foulkes goes on to 
develop his psychosocial ontology, emphasizing both the contemporaneous “horizontal”, 
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material, “economic, climatic” community and group aspects, and the “vertical”, 
intergenerational, historical aspects of the social that “literally permeate” (1948:14) the 
individual.v In the language of Goldstein’s neurology, he posits an understanding of the 
individual as “part of a social network, a little nodal point, as it were” (1948:14). 
Challenging psychoanalysis to take seriously “the patient’s total life situation”, rather 
than seeing “`life’ and `reality’ merely as projection, screen and reflector of his 
`unconscious phantasies’”, Foulkes asserts that they are indeed both “at the same time. 
The truth is, that the two can never be separated” (1948:15).  
 
Foulkes advocated this psychosocial ontology as essential to group analysis in a number 
of later writings.vi His 1966 paper, Some Basic Concepts in Group Psychotherapy, 
specifies that group analysis is developing: 
a method and theory that would do away with such pseudo-problems as biological 
versus cultural, somatogenic versus psychogenic, individual versus group and 
reality versus phantasy. Instead we must endeavour to use concepts which from 
the beginning do justice to an integrated view (1966:155).  
In 1973, in developing the concept of the matrix, he suggests: 
As group analysts we do not share the psychoanalytic juxtaposition of an 
“internal” psychological reality and an “external” physical or social reality which, 
for psychoanalysis, makes good sense. What is inside is outside, the “social” is not 
external but very much internal too and penetrates the innermost being of the 
individual personality (1973:226-7). 
And in 1974, in the context of expounding his philosophy of mind, he says:  
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we cannot make the conventional sharp differentiation between inside and outside, 
or between phantasy and reality. What is inside is always also outside, what is 
outside is inside as well (1974:278). 
 
However, a close reading of both his 1948 book and his whole oeuvre suggests that 
Foulkes does not consistently and coherently adhere to this psychosocial “both/and” 
position. On one hand, he is rhetorically drawn to emphasizing the group as “basic and 
central” (1948:15), and the primacy of the social, continuously speaking to an 
unchanging, unspecified psychoanalytic audience that registers little of the fierce debates 
that characterized psychoanalysis during the middle decades of the 20th century.vii On the 
other hand, beyond his attempts to conceptualize the immediacy of processes within the 
group analytic situation, most notably in terms of the matrix, and through an emphasis on 
communication and belonging, and their failures, his clinical discussions fail to engage 
explicitly with the dynamics of social relations, particularly in terms of their complex, 
gendered, racialized, national, and class differentiated historicity.viii The compulsive lure 
of a position that emphasises one side over the other, and the lack of a language with 
which to explore the complexities of the imbrication of the psychic and the social, mean 
that he does not develop a truly psychosocial group analytic theory.  
 
Transcending the dichotomy - thinking relationally 
 
That said, across Foulkes’ body of writing elements of a new, relational mode of thinking 
are discernible that might facilitate a move beyond the language of the individual/society 
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dichotomy. The relationality that Foulkes begins to articulate – without naming it as such 
– resonates with the emergence of both relational sociology and relational 
psychoanalysis, which each have their roots in the period in which Foulkes was active but 
which have only been named as such more recently.ix Although they have developed 
separately, with almost no mutual recognition, Foulkes’ writing is suggestive of the 
possibilities of bringing them together. 
 Resources for relational thinking 
 
Emirbayer (1997), the author of the influential Manifesto for a Relational Sociology, 
points out that there is a fundamental dilemma facing all those who seek to understand 
the social world: the choice between substantialism and relationalism. This is crystallized 
in the distinction between conceptualizing the world in terms of substances – that is, in 
terms of static things - or in terms of processes - dynamic, unfolding relations (Ketokivi, 
2010; Emirbayer, 1997; Elias, 1978), social networks and social ties/ bonds (e.g. White, 
1992). The individual/ society dualism is rooted in a substantialist ontology, which posits 
both sides of the dualism as static things, things which might be seen either to act under 
their own powers, or alternatively to “interact”, but which nonetheless remain fixed and 
unchanging throughout their interaction (Ketokivi, 2010:61).x Against this, Emirbayer 
calls for a transactional approach, which focuses on supra-personal relations, rather than 
on “individuals” or “society”.  This idea of a relational sociology, which is increasingly 
significant within the discipline for the challenge it poses to the dominant substantialist 
tradition of positivist sociology, offers group analysis a productive way of 
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conceptualizing the social as always in movement, as processual and fluid, constituted of 
and through relations. 
 
Developing in different terrain, but also with great potential for the renewal of group 
analytic thinking, is the now highly influential school of relational psychoanalysis that 
has, like relational sociology, emerged in recent years in the United States. xi At the core 
of relational psychoanalysis is the idea, fundamental to object relations theory (e.g. Klein, 
1948; Fairbairn, 1952; Winnicott, 1958, 1965), that the self is constructed relationally. 
Object relations psychoanalysis posits a developmental theory in which the 
fundamentally dependent infant has to become aware of its separateness, its individuality   
and boundaries of self through its relationship with the mother. In Winnicott’s much cited 
phrase, “there is no such thing as a baby (apart from maternal provision)” (1965:39), 
because the primary care-giver/ mother-child matrix, and the unconscious attunment of 
mother to baby, make the very existence of the child possible. According to Winnicott, 
individuality and the “capacity to be alone” emerge through the internalization of the 
benign presence of the mother. The self is, therefore, from the outset, intrinsically social 
and intersubjective, and its sense of agency and autonomy are inherently relational. As 
Joan Riviere puts it: 
There is no such thing as a single human being, pure and simple, unmixed with 
other human beings. Each personality is a world in himself, a company of many. 
That self, that life of one’s own, which is in fact so precious though so casually 
taken for granted, is a composite structure which has been and is being formed and 
built up since the day of our birth out of countless never-ending influences and 
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exchanges between ourselves and others […] These other persons are in fact 
therefore parts of ourselves, not indeed the whole of them but such parts or aspects 
of them as we had our relation with, and as have thus become parts of us. […] We 
are members one of another (Riviere, 1952, quoted in Chodorow, 1999:116).  
 
The notion of intersubjectivity – “the field of intersection between two subjectivities, the 
interplay between two different subjective worlds” (Benjamin, 1995:29) – which entered 
psychoanalysis from critical theory has come to occupy a central place within 
contemporary relational psychoanalysis. Understood by Jessica Benjamin as “a fragile, 
unenclosed space”, the concept emphasizes the ongoing permeability of the boundaries of 
the self, and the ways in which “the apparently isolated subject constantly assimilates 
what is outside itself” (Benjamin, 1998:79). Benjamin (1988; 1995;1998) argues that the 
self is, in an ongoing way, reciprocally constituted in relation to the other, and therefore 
depends on the other’s recognition. The self is constituted out of a pre-existing 
“relational, social, linguistic matrix” (Mitchell, 2000:57). From this matrix are forged 
“individual psyches with subjectively experienced interior spaces”.  
Those subjective spaces begin as microcosms of the relational field, in which 
macrocosmic interpersonal relationships are internalized and transformed into a 
distinctly personal experience; and those personal experiences are, in turn, 
regulated and transformed, generating newly emergent properties, which in turn 
create new interpersonal forms that alter macrocosmic patterns of interaction. 
Interpersonal relational processes generate intrapsychic relational processes which 
reshape interpersonal processes reshaping intrapsychic processes, and so on in an 
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endless Mobius strip in which internal and external are perpetually regenerating 
and transforming themselves and each other (Mitchell, 2000: 57).xii 
 
In this way, relational psychoanalysis starts to move beyond the language of “individual 
and society”. From a group analytic perspective, however, relational psychoanalysis is 
inherently limited by its roots in the dyadic psychoanalytic encounter. It fails to grapple 
with the small group, the median/ meso-level group, and the large group, and the 
movement from meso to macro-level social, cultural and political relations and 
processes. 
 
 Relational thinking in Foulkes 
Much of the time, wherever he is situating himself in relation to the individual/ society 
dichotomy, Foulkes is implicitly invoking a substantialist ontology. However, running 
through his work, in the language of processes, events, happenings, and field (e.g. in 
Foulkes, 1973), these is also a more sociologically and psychoanalytically relational 
strand of thinking (predating these bodies of thought by many years) that implicitly 
bypasses and subverts the dichotomy. Through this he begins to weave a psychosocial 
approach to relationality. We can see this, above all, in his elaboration of his central 
concept of the matrix, “the network of all individual mental processes” in the analytic 
group, which he understands as a construct, rather like “traffic”: “a concert of 
interactions”, of processes, to be seen “not merely as interpersonal but as transpersonal” 
(1966:154). Conscious and unconscious communication, verbal and embodied, the 
associations, responses and dialogue within the group, which he regards as “based on the 
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common ground of the unconscious instinctive understanding of each other” (Foulkes, 
1966:157), is then the material of group analysis. The therapist’s task is to focus on the 
“total interactional field, on the matrix in which these unconscious reactions meet”, rather 
than attempting to follow each individual separately (1966:157). Speaking in a not 
dissimilar way to Riviere (above), he argues that “what is called `the mind’ consists of 
interacting processes between a number of closely linked persons, commonly called a 
group” (Foulkes, 1973:224). When people come together in a small group, they create a 
“field of mental happenings”, “transpersonal processes” that “like X-rays in the bodily 
sphere, go right through the individuals composing such a `network’” (1973:224). The 
concept of the matrix, which has a fundamentally non-substantialist, relational flavour, is 
utilized to grasp these processes, and he rejects the concept of a “group mind”: 
because this is a substantivation of what is meant and as unsatisfactory as speaking 
of an individual mind. The mind is not a thing which exists but a series of events, 
moving and proceeding all the time (1973:224).  
 
Deepening matrixial thinking 
 
To conclude, I want to briefly consider how we might further develop the relational 
thinking that begins to emerge in Foulkes’s work as part of a project of transcending the 
individual/society dualism. To do this I draw on the work of feminist psychoanalyst and 
artist Bracha Ettinger. There is, as Dalal (1998:50) points out, a tantalizing passage in 
which Foulkes suggests that “what in later development can be usefully abstracted as 
superego, ego and id arise from a common matrix, beginning at birth or perhaps even 
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prenatally” (1972:236). Sounding a rather irritated note, Dalal comments: “to keep in line 
with his other ideas, this would mean that the social world would somehow have to 
migrate across the womb and enter the neonate. He avoids engaging in the subject of how 
such an extraordinary thing might occur, which surely he is beholden to do” (1998:50). 
Ettinger, I propose, offers us a provocative theory of just this process – attending to what 
we might understand as the capacity for sociality, rather than the content of the social 
world. Suggestively for group analysis, Ettinger refers to her theory, with no reference to 
Foulkes, as “matrixial”. 
 
Ettinger’s linguistically and conceptually challenging work (2006a, 2006b) critiques both 
the Freudian-Lacanian traditions in psychoanalysis and the newer relational 
intersubjective paradigm, the former with its emphasis on castration and the Oedipal 
moment, and the latter with it focus on the affective dynamics of attachment and 
separation between mother and infant. Both schools, she argues, conceptualize the subject 
through the lens of separations, splits, cuts and cleavages. Central to Ettinger’s theory is 
the notion of trans-subjectivity which originates in the language-defying state prior to 
birth – the “transgressive encounter between I and non-I grounded in the maternal womb/ 
intra-uterine complex” (Ettinger, 2006b:218), a state of severality, of jointness in 
separation, of neither one nor two. She argues for the existence of “the matrixial stratum 
of subjectivization”. This is the “feeling knowing” that pre-exists birth for everyone who 
has been a foetus moving inside a woman: the feeling-knowing of “a dynamic 
borderspace” that constitutes both differentiation and linking, connectivity and co-
inhabitation. Beyond the conscious knowledge of the singular subject (the individual), the 
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trans-subjective stratum of subjectivity is “delivered to us all, irrespective of later gender 
alignment and sexual orientation, from the primordial severality of human becoming in 
the intimacy and sexual specificity of the feminine” (Pollock: 2008:13). The “matrixial 
borderspace” is the psychic space which is trans-subjective and sub-subjective, and 
precedes and sometimes over-rides the separate subject. Ettinger’s Matrix  
speaks to the strangeness in me, as well as that of the intimate other irreducible to 
what, in later phallic constructions, will form the basis of identifications and 
rejections, incorporations and expulsions that mark and create boundaries and 
identities for discrete territorialized subjects by whom such porousness or 
breaching of boundaries can only be experienced as perversion (2006a:17).  
 
Although Ettinger theorizes from the dyadic mother-foetus relation, and practices a two-
person mode of psychoanalysis, her ideas are potentially generative for group analysis. 
Her more profound, earlier conceptualization of relationality offers us a radical 
understanding of subjectivity- as-encounter, and a language with which to think about 
trans-subjective unconscious transmission, the affect that flows so powerfully between 
people in analytic groups, as in all forms of intimate relationship, transgressing the 
boundaries of the individual. It also suggests a way of thinking about the capacity for 
what Ettinger calls “shareability”, or what Foulkes describes, in more prosaic terms, as 
the sense of belonging, of being “a respected and effective member of the group, being 
accepted, being able to share and to participate”, which he regarded as a basic 
“constructive experience” of human life (1966:155-6). Her work suggests that the 
potential to connect, relate, bond, and communicate beyond the boundaries of the 
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embodied individual, which is activated so powerfully in group analytic psychotherapy, 
is inherent in us all, by virtue of having been a foetus inside another human being. Our 
capacity to link across borders, to form the social bonds and attachments with and 
through which group analysis works, rests on our earliest experiences which are of 
simultaneous jointness and separation. With the notion of trans-subjectivity, and a theory 
of its genesis in the universal experience of our biological becoming, Ettinger moves 
radically beyond the dualisms that have so preoccupied post-Enlightenment thought. 
 
 
Concluding thoughts 
 
In thinking about the most puzzling, moving and mutative moments in my experience as 
both member and conductor of group analytic groups – the moments when affect passes 
between people like electricity, when the atmosphere palpably changes, when members 
are able to grasp another’s psychic reality despite the inadequacy of language to represent 
its depth and complexity – it is not for the concepts of individual and society that I reach, 
nor even for the idea of the individual as an abstraction from a greater, more elemental 
whole. Such substantialist modes of thought might seem to provide some solid ground for 
the group analyst, but should we wish for solid ground, when our task is to attend to the 
flow?  The language that offers me an ability to swim with the fast moving waters of the 
group is one of relationality, of process, permeability, and trans-subjectivity. Elements of 
such a language were there at the beginning of group analysis, and it is such a language, I 
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believe, that is ultimately more able to capture the vital, fluid, transpersonal, matrixial 
dynamics with which we work. 
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